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Environments for Interdisciplinary
Research on Perception and Action
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School of Arts
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
This paper suggests ways in which art processes may contribute to the interdisci-
plinary study of perception and action and the relationships between body, person,
and environment. Artists-turned-architects Arakawa and Gins serve as the most
advanced example of an interdisciplinary research project in terms of coordinating
material processes with contemporary findings, methods, and orientations from
across the arts, humanities, and hard and soft sciences. In the first section of
the paper, I discuss Arakawa and Gins’s Reversible Destiny Lofts at Mitaka as
an example of their procedural approach to long-term sustainable experimental
environments. In the second section, the tactics through which Arakawa and Gins
have repositioned art for the nonart purposes and common research goals are
posited. Finally, I briefly outline the disciplinary positions and research values
needed in order to move toward a more inclusive and interdisciplinary research
practice.
Artworks have often supplied examples and demonstrations1 of ecological prin-
ciples; however, art processes and artists’ sensitivities may prove more useful
than artworks in the study of perception and action. Practice-led research in
Correspondence should be addressed to Jondi Keane, 32 Maddocks Street, Brisbane, Queensland
4104, Australia. E-mail: j.keane@griffith.edu.au
1Art is often used to demonstrate ecological principles. For example, Surrealist paintings high-
light figure–ground illusions, and Magritte is often used to discuss occlusion, or the Impressionists
offer examples of Gestalt and relation of retinal sensitivity to perceptual awareness.
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the arts, with its emphasis on materials, processes, and embodied approaches
to the construction of enriched environments, shares ecological concerns and
can offer fresh perspectives on the experimental design of environments and
research methods in the life sciences. In this paper I trace some of the tactics
of artist-turned-architects Arakawa and Gins to the anti-art propositions of Mar-
cel Duchamp. Arakawa and Gins’s inclusive approach emphasizes the human
capability to distribute systems of value in ways that are no longer linked to
natural constraints but to building environments as tools for learning about the
organism–environment relationship.
The ability to design environments to help persons reflect on their own
perception and understand the structure of perception complicates the analysis
of events, encounters, affordances, and effectivities. By noticing the values by
which we measure the measures, obstacles that inhibit interdisciplinary research
can be discussed openly. Arakawa and Gins’s work allow a person to track their
embodied observations and apply what they have learned to an ongoing enactive
research. In many ways the measuring of measures underpins all the discussions
in this paper. As difficult as it is to unpack the disciplinary differences in
measure, it is more difficult to unpack different ways in which individuals use
and value the modalities of measure.
From my point of view, within the arts and humanities, focusing of attention
for the purposes of research on one value versus another points to the reintro-
duction of introspective and contemplative or phenomenological experiencing
into scientific method after a century of exile. Eugene Gendlin (2000) suggested
the need to embrace first-person process or first-person science as “a science of
subjective experiences interconnected to third-person science by virtue of a new
science akin to ecology, and study of complex processes” (p. 109). First-person
science places a high value on difference and perhaps harkens back to Heraclitus,
who famously noted we cannot step into the same waters twice. This stance on
identity perceives and values change over persistence, a stance that challenges
the foundations of identity. Over the past 2 decades, cognitive science has been
attempting to naturalize phenomenology in order to reintroduce the benefits of
introspection2 and reevaluate the observer’s ability to accurately describe the
correlation of affect and biological process. This affects how researchers might
devise environments for research.
2Current trends in cognitive science and in philosophy of science that attempt to naturalize
Husserlian phenomenology (Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, & Roy, 1999) and reintroduce the benefits of
introspection (Varela & Shear, 1999) attest to the importance of the observer/participant. To some
extent, James J. Gibson’s interest in Marleau-Ponty’s embodied approach (1979/1986) anticipates,
though it does not explicitly acknowledge, this trajectory. Other scholars working on similar lines
include Ellis (2000), Alva Noë (2004), Shaun Gallagher (2005), Dan Zahavi (2005), Gallagher and
Zahavi (2008), Dorothea Olkowski (2007), and Elizabeth Grosz (1994, 2004).
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ENVIRONMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE RESEARCH
In order to rethink the adequacy of current environments as environments that
sustain life or research, Arakawa and Gins’s procedural architecture, and the
researcher/participant it invokes, propose to optimize the human capacity to
interact with the environment, to rapidly shift the assignation and distribution
of value. There are several ecological psychology research projects (presented
at the 14th International Conference on Perception and Action [ICPA 14], some
of which are mentioned here), that move toward processes currently operating
in the arts and humanities.
Experiments conducted within standardized/institutionalized architectural sur-
roundings predispose or prepare the participant to respond in habitual ways. This
raises an issue that is, in my view, directly related to the idea of invariance. If
an environment is unique and has features that are not present in any other
environment, a researcher will treat events and experiments that occur in that
environment quite differently from a researcher who assumes that any classroom,
by nature of the institutionalized standardization of these spaces, will share the
same conditions for perception and action. Mantel, Bardy, and Stoffregen (2008)
discuss the possible influences and biases that object–environment relationships
may have upon the experimental study of affordances. One solution to avoiding
such a bias requires a larger scale integrated experimental environment.3 Rather
than settling for a certain level of similarity, if researchers assume a necessary
degree of difference and attempt to identify these differences, then the structure
of the experiments and the exactitude of the finding might be enhanced.
Arakawa and Gins’s architectural surrounds are the most ambitious example
of research originating in the arts that share the ecological objective of studying
the relation of organism to environment. They understand that this approach
translates into the way experimental environments are designed and operate,
and they propose to go further by invigorating experimental research through
sustainable and robust living laboratories.
My discussion of Arakawa and Gins’s Reversible Destiny Lofts at Mitaka
(Tokyo) serves to outline the initial conditions of a new approach to constructing
experimental ecological environments. They would be extending ecological prin-
ciples slightly by asserting that thinking environmentally and asking questions in
the round requires architectural support. They suggest that architecture should be
recognized and deployed as a tool for studying the extent of the site of person and
the degree to which the body and the person share events but not extent (Arakawa
3They evaluated different findings and the inconsistent relation of critical boundary and median
value in experiments on “reachability.” They categorized the different types of experiments according
to the use of body-scaled sets of distances adapted to participants, non-body-scaled single distances,
and different distance intervals adapted to reaching condition and made recommendations.
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& Gins, 1994, p. 68). If while constructing, persons were to resist standardizing
the floors, walls, and ceilings with the ready-made affordances in tow, then they
would have to perceive and act in entirely other ways—“functions” could be
made to serve heuristic as well as practical goals. Arakawa and Gins distinguish
procedure from function, arguing, “An architectural surround that is functional,
such as a space capsule, and such as the greater part of the built world of our
day, facilitates an organism that persons in its actions, extending the senses no
questions asked, whereas an architectural surround that is procedural, a tactically
posed surround, fills an organism that persons with questions by enabling it to
move within and between its own modes of sensing” (Gins & Arakawa, 2002,
p. 58). There are two important terms in this quotation that will facilitate further
discussion. They use the phrase “organism that persons,” with “persons” as a
verb, as a single phrase that more accurately describes the set of conditions,
born of actions, that makes person-formation possible and is the result of how
an organism positions its body in the surroundings (2002, p. 1). A “tactically
posed surround” is an environment designed with an experimental purpose in
mind that allows a visitor to perceive the phenomena under observation and
benefit from his or her awareness. The purpose is procedural, literally to enable
the perception of one’s own modes of perceiving, which may lead to an ability
to move or reconfigure habitual dispositions. Grammar school students are often
not aware until later life that they learn better visually or aurally. Students who
become aware of their predisposition can take informed actions to accentuate
their sensory preference. Making sure they can see the white or black board
notes, taping lectures, or making diagrams can aid learning. In Arakawa and
Gins’s architecture, discursive and built tactics always serve the goal of inviting
thought and/or action to move from function to procedure and emphasize the
perspective of the researchers/participants and their emergent capacities.
After the Fourteenth International Conference on Perception and Action in
Yokohama, I led a group of 12 delegates on an expedition to the Reversible
Destiny Lofts at Mitaka. We were met by the director of the Architectural
Body Research Foundation (Japan), Momoyo Homma, and physicist Dr. Takashi
Ikegami. The delegation ate lunch and held informal conversations with the
residents, who talked frankly about living in tactically posed surrounds. It was
my hope that the discussions would lead to identifying how the built surrounds
invite experimental opportunities suited to the research topics presented at the
conference; however, time prohibited discussion at this level. Most, if not all,
delegates expressed excitement and enthusiasm about the Loft environment in
relation to their own sensory experiences. After traveling by train and then
by bus from Yokohama through Tokyo into the city’s sprawling suburbs, the
delegation arrived on foot at the Reversible Destiny Lofts. The brightly colored
patchwork exterior stood out against everything else in view or that had been
viewed on the journey (see Figure 1). The set of nine apartments stacked in three
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FIGURE 1 Reversible Destiny Lofts—exterior.
connected towers raised smiles from passersby. Each stack of three apartments
is slightly rotated on its axis away from the parallel orientation to the street and
in relation to each other. Each Loft unit has a combination of the same-shaped
rooms (cube, sphere, tube, and central sunken kitchen). These combinations
are rotated across the different apartments over three stories and in each tower
stack (see Figure 2). A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 reveals that the tubular
room (the bathroom with a tubular shower stall intersecting it vertically) is
positioned next to the meditation room in one apartment (Figure 3) and is
positioned next to a bay window in the middle tower apartments (Figure 4).
The residents live a communal and village-type life, often visiting each other’s
apartments and the unit that houses the Reversible Destiny office. This allows
for a comparison between the layout, orientation, and color scheme in order to
challenge the categories by which we organize spatial and sensory memory. The
arrangement works against stabilization of perceptual cues and the formation of
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FIGURE 2 Reversible Destiny Lofts—unit floor plan.
perceptual habits. The complexity of the Lofts design means that one cannot
entirely become accustomed the mounds and bumps in the floor or the changing
conditions of light under which the color modulates. Some information systems,
although seemingly static, such as a Jackson Pollock painting or a novel by
Marcel Proust or a Charles Olson poem, attain a dynamic complexity comparable
to the complexity of life environments. A good design for a golf course would be
one that, although the features do not change, offers a range of situations, levels
of difficulty, and complexity that sustains years of play by top players. Similarly,
an architectural environment deigned to challenge the conditions of life may not
reproduce the appearance of features of the world but offer instead a set of
conditions that allow a person to question the way perception and recognition
operates for himself or herself.
The systematic distribution of color—both in the number of colors and color
combinations—divides the surfaces, once again bringing memory and direct
perception into close proximity. This is complicated further by the fact that all the
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FIGURE 3 Reversible Destiny Lofts—interior.
FIGURE 4 Reversible Destiny Lofts—levels and scale.
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colors which appear on the exterior correspond with colors on the interior walls,
as if the color has bled through the walls. Without wanting to labor the point
too much, if a person perceives the correspondence of interior to exterior color
it might mean the color is part of the material rather than applied to the surface
of the material and force a person, even momentarily, to make a perceptual-
conceptual connection (or dissolution) that other buildings that do not have a
heuristic aspect to their design would not include. In this way the purpose with
which Arakawa and Gins’s Lofts are purpose-built is the observation of one’s
own perception, the ability to learn about the way this perception operates, and
the possibility to move across modalities or reconfigure one’s own modes of
sensing. Nothing is accidental in the arrangement or apportioning of architectural
features (to the extent this is possible). Each environment offers opportunities
to study the separation of conceptual and perceptual processing by challenging
the way a perceiver disconnects interior and exterior surface and the way he or
she connects surface to shape. We are accustomed to separating structural form
from architectural surfaces by anticipating standardized layouts and color-to-
surface correspondence. The bleed-through color exercises a person’s memory
of the building from the outside, prompting a spatial puzzle if one were to
calculate a current location in the Lofts by correlating an exterior image of
the color placement, with an estimation of the entire complex and the current
view from within the Loft. Further, the division of colors on a single wall and
the distribution of colors across walls destabilizes the accuracy and modalities
engaged to perceive of depth, distance, and scale because intense colors have
very different ambient and spatial characteristics. If all the walls were the same
color, a comparison could be established to stabilize the perceptual pickup of
depth, scale, and distance. There are conditions under which the color in the
Lofts changes: the color variables (hue, value, and intensity) change program-
matically from wall to wall within a single Loft as part of a perceptual puzzle
included in the design; however, there is no consistency of color from room
to room or Loft to Loft. Despite a limited number of colors used in the Lofts,
the colors of shaped rooms and colors of walls next to the rooms are never
repeated. The program of colors is different for each apartment (different stories
in different tower stacks); and the color conditions change in each Loft due to
spatial orientations (direction of daylight due to different rotation to the street).
As a result of all these variables, it becomes very difficult to establish one mode
of measure that grounds or produces perceptual consistency for a single Loft or
for all the Loft environments. In addition, features such as the brightly colored
vertical poles, which are part of each Loft space, have slightly varying scales
and dimensions (diameters) confounding the perception of depth, size relation,
and distance if they are assumed to be of equal size. Similarly, the colored
ladders (see Figures 5 and 6) are slightly miniature in comparison with all
other commercially produced ladders, which also reveals that people do things
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FIGURE 5 Reversible Destiny Lofts—floor.
FIGURE 6 Reversible Destiny Lofts—scale.
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and have experiences that reveal their prior adjustment to standardized ladders,
perhaps without ever having reflected on their expectation. The tactically posed
surround means that the degree to which our modes of perception and correlation
anticipate standardized uniformity is broken down and made apparent as a
procedural consideration of the architectural design. The color environment alone
offers an ongoing perceptual challenge and contributes to a growing awareness
of perceptual habits, strengths, preferences, and assumptions.
Two procedures deployed by Arakawa and Gins in the Reversible Destiny
Lofts at Mitaka are disperse-to-contrast procedure and tentative constructing
towards a holding in place procedure. These enact what they describe. The
color scheme is a good example of how disperse-to-contrast procedure acts as
a mode of constructing and as a mode of awareness. Procedures operate at
more than one scale and in more than one modality; they are both discursive
sequences and perception-and-action goals. It is important to note here that
Arakawa and Gins consider all modes of activity equally important. Their
position can be summarized by a statement in Architectural Body: “What will
need to be studied is which types and combinations of bodily movements are
most conducive to an optimal tentative constructing towards a holding in place,
and which constructed discursive sequences best constrain them” (2002, p. 59).
This indicates that it is crucial not to omit discursive constraints from bodily
processes or from organism-environment considerations. We must make every
effort not to exclude the person from the study of the organism-environment
because experiences are experiencable in the same way that other events might
be directly perceived.
I feel that it is important to make a brief digression here to discuss the issue
of discursive constraint as environmental information because it is a supposition
that Arakawa and Gins make regarding attention, perception, and awareness. One
way to think about the discourse as constraint has been provided by Robert Ver-
brugge’s (1987) discussion of language and event perception in which he aims to
“dissolve the category boundaries that now appear to divide comprehension from
perception” (p. 160). Verbrugge focuses on the relation of words to listeners’
experiences and actions that extend beyond representational relations to include
“the perception of the speaker’s cognitive actions and communicative intentions,
and they include the virtual events and cognitive actions that are regulated in part
by what the speaker says” (p. 162). Verbrugge uses Peirce’s notion of index4
4Peirce’s definition of index is distinguished from icons (relations established by similarity) and
symbols (relations established by arbitrary conventions). An index is a sign that refers to the object
it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that object (Buchler, 1955, p. 102). Anything that
focuses attention is an index (p. 108); anything that startles us is an index insofar as it marks the
junction between two portions of experience (p. 109).
RESEARCH ON PERCEPTION AND ACTION 353
as a way to consider the events to which language is a response, a prompt
and trigger. Rather than suggesting that language is an index of environmental
events, I argue that Verbrugge is proposing language to be an index of embodied
events that should not be considered separately from environmental events. In
this way he is attempting to bring the complexity of the human experience
through the events that spoken, written, and audible language introduce into
the environment. Verbrugge uses the word trigger to foreground the events of
the organism-environment in which “cognitive actions are no less happenings
than rolling stones or diving gannets” (p. 157, footnote 1). Verbrugge provides
a way of considering experience as part of the environment that can be directly
perceived and that constrains the following of imaginings without containing
representation of their own process or results (p. 170).
Disciplinary positions that either include or exclude the language as event
account for the differing measures of what constitutes an “affordance.” Because
I am trying to suggest ways by which affordances can include the experiencing
of experiences and of relationships and modes of perceiving, the notion of
affordance is worth reviewing. Warren and Shaw (1985) summarize Gibson’s
term affordance as the “measurable properties of the environment construed
functionally, as they may serve an animal’s actions, facilitate its adaptations
and support its intentions” and go on to note that affordances are different
from physical properties in that they are “measured relationally, with respect
to an intentional act” (p. 11). The perceiver-specific aspect was formalized
as effectivities, which Shaw and Mace (2003) define as “an agent’s control-
relevant task-constraints” (p. 202) or “capabilities that activate categories of
potential encounters which affordances name” (Warren & Shaw, 1985, p. 12).
Language considered as an event opens a space of inference in which language
and perception intermingle. In this sense an index may be described as the
affordance of an affordance, which increases the selection capacity of the human
organism–environment.
Therefore, if we consider Arakawa and Gins’s discursive procedures as lan-
guage events consistent with Verbrugge’s argument, then procedures have the
capacity to attune and reconfigure relationships, produce effectivity-affordance
couplings, and invite other multimodal configurations. The procedures provide
new effectivities because they supply heuristic purposes and recursive practices
that guide the activation of potential afforded by the building site and materials.
It is expected that any resident/researcher or researcher/participant could develop
procedures of his or her own. This is precisely the opposite of allowing new
habitual routines to replace old ones. Arakawa and Gins provide guidance for
the invention and assembly of architectural procedures (Gins & Arakawa, 2006,
pp. 155–167) by focusing and refocusing perception through the “sited awareness
hypothesis”:
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What stems from the body by way of awareness should be held to be of it. Any
site at which a person finds an X to exist should be considered a contributing
segment of her awareness. (Gins & Arakawa, 2002, p. 50)
The procedural approach applies to perception and action, to perceiving the
world and constructing experiments for living. Procedures enable persons to
think environmentally when engaging with and organizing their surroundings
(conceptually and perceptually). The goals of turning our inquisitive mode
of living into a viable research program also turn researchers into procedu-
ral architects—persons who realize at every step that the activity of conduct-
ing research cannot be separated from the active production of meaning and
value.
An example of a procedure, for Arakawa and Gins, is one that they call
“disperse-to-contrast.” Disperse-to-contrast procedure facilitates what Arakawa
and Gins call critical resemblance, which occurs as “information states produced
when someone moves through the slightly different layouts and features of paired
tactically posed surrounds that would naturally reflect—inflect and deflect—
built-in closely comparable differences” (Gins & Arakawa, 2002, p. 58). It is
through the seemingly similarity that difference emerges. The expectation of
finding symmetry interferes with perceiving the specificity and situated struc-
ture of relationships. We come to appreciate that there is a generalizing effect
that pervades our perception. For example, in Arakawa and Gins’s work one
may find two adjacent rooms that are seemingly identical but one room is
rotated 90 degrees. From one vantage point a person can perceive two sets
of information arrays that can be applied to his or her current location. The
person is afforded views from two angles that both transform under movement
and double the capacity and the ability to find clarity and exploit potential.
This form of transposed comparison inflects the information array with specific
additional input and deflects the information array by providing input that does
not necessarily jibe with our memory or knowledge of objects (e.g., if the far
side or underside of an object is not as one thought). Critical resemblance
often involves perception of symmetry, which in the Lofts is implied by the
placement of the rooms but is confounded by the lack of perceptual measures
(by which to perceptually determine spatial location and relationship) and the
slightly asymmetrical design.5 These circumstances for observation and learning
about the plasticity of perception and the correlation of top-down and bottom-up
processing will not occur naturally; they must be built and tactically posed and
experienced over periods of time.
5These 3-dimensional considerations of symmetry would correlate with and benefit from Klaus
Landwehr’s (2007) research on different types of symmetry and symmetry recognition.
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Arakawa and Gins are rigorous in their selection of research questions and
in their construction of experimental environments. I assert that their residence-
laboratories provide reenterable conditions in contexts which would yield both
observable and phenomenological data. These residence-laboratories also enable
researchers/participants to track multiple experiments or selected tasks without
reducing the ecological conditions. Some of the research topics from the ICPA 14
conference that I feel would find suitable architectural support in the Reversible
Destiny Lofts sufficient to yield viable research include the study of the flux of
action selection, the multisensory nature of spatial attention, and especially the
connection of vision to touch and proprioception. Researchers/participants would
be able to track the changing boundaries between different adaptive modalities
of attention over different scales of time.
The calibrated use of scale in the Lofts requires the researcher/participant
to adjust the connection between vision and proprioception to judge distance
because the visual information is either purposefully insufficient or must be
reevaluated according to proprioceptive information regarding the pitch of the
floor. The topography appears inconsistent with the program of standardization
evident in most all built environments. If the color of the walls makes the
perception of location of surface difficult, it is not aided by a geometrically
receding floor or floor pattern that might be used to resolve the location of the
wall surfaces. It is not that the walls and floor do not correspond to a similar
and agreed upon code of construction; it is that no architectural link or feature
has been provided by which to correlate features that emphasize visual versus
tactile proficiency.
The central undulating floor presents constant challenges to walking because
the terrain is constantly shifting and varies by over a meter across the room
compounded by random topographical changes. Such a terrain would facilitate
the study of accuracy of perception of size and distance and the variability of
performance in terms of motor control, coordination, and posture in walking.
Reports of older persons who have trouble walking visiting the Lofts indicated
that the uneven terrain afforded supported walking, whereas those habituated to
hard level floors, such as myself, felt destabilized and often off balance on the
Loft terrains.
Other research questions from the ICPA 14 conference that would also benefit
from the experimental conditions embedded in the Loft environment include the
ability to reproduce distance traversed, the coupling of bimanual, interlimb, and
multiperson movements, the global effects of local forces, and the dynamic
development of structures through self-organization. Changes in environmental
features will require adjustments to accommodate even the most ordinary pur-
poses (making a cup of coffee or answering the door). Such adjustments emerge
from the daily research of living, which unlike Duchamp’s propositions does
not require art to contextualize their meaning.
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RECONFIGURING RESEARCH
In this section, I discuss the ways in which art may be used for nonart’s
sake—that is to say, for common research goals and the study of perception
and action in particular. Gins and Arakawa (2002) propose that the common
research “should no longer be done off to one side, in a school, a library, a
laboratory. Where one lives needs to become a laboratory for researching, for
mapping directly the living body, oneself as world-forming inhabitant” (p. xxi)
and add that “the body must either escape or ‘reenter’ habitual patterns of
action—habitual actions that have customized life into a few standard patterns”
(p. 62). Their “daily research” (pp. 95–96), which relies heavily on the sus-
tained, introspective capacity of persons conducting research, highlights the fact
that conducting research cannot be separated from constructing (selecting and
acting upon) features of the world. Arakawa and Gins choose to use the term
constructing to emphasize and include the problematic psychological baggage
because the risk of omitting the person from the organism-person-surround has
far more detrimental effects. One of the many research questions that focus on
first-person participation is, “How does one observe and adjust attention’s grip
on itself?” (Gins & Arakawa, 2002, p. 70).
In order to offer the findings of these activities as research, and not as the
expression of or critique of a worldview or phenomenon, it has been necessary
for Arakawa and Gins to reposition their art not as art but rather as theories and
structures, activities and procedures subject to the criteria of common research
goals. In this way, Arakawa and Gins constantly put themselves between a rock
and a hard place. Eschewing the notion of art puts them at odds with artists, sug-
gesting it is not possible to work out philosophical questions without reworking
our relation to the environment puts them at odds with some philosophers, and
charging architects with being concerned only about architecture rather than the
study of persons has created tension with many architects.
By no longer claiming the position of artists, Arakawa and Gins place their
work on par with, rather than at a distance from, the collective of researchers in
a common world.6 The idea of deploying findings generated by art-for-art’s-sake
for nonart purposes has its precedent in the work of Arakawa and Gins’s friend
Marcel Duchamp. Following Duchamp’s lead, many contemporary artists have
developed an expertise in understanding how the process of recontextualization
affects the coupling of effectivities and affordances. By this I mean that there is
an important distinction between affordances that arises when an object is placed
into a different context and affordances that result from a stationary object whose
context shifts (suddenly or slowly) around it. Duchamp was the first artist to fully
6See McEvilley (2005) and Marcus (1989) for two histories of importance of anti-art or nonart
to the development of art.
RESEARCH ON PERCEPTION AND ACTION 357
exploit the activation of the environment rather than the object as the artwork by
producing a rapid shift of information, within a closed system of meaning (such
as a gallery) in order to nullify perceptual, conceptual, and automatic responses.
This shift was not achieved by fabrication but rather recontextualization. The
famous urinal turned “fountain” changed the neutral context of the gallery (as
a site of presentation) into something more akin to a laboratory. Duchamp’s
conceptual-perceptual propositions regarding the way an object can change its
surroundings indicated that the context of meaning can succumb to instantly
transportable and transposable ready-made positions.
Arakawa and Gins’s built environments manufacture nodal points in order
to loosen prior effectivity-affordance strongholds by multiplying the ways in
which they can be formed. Robert Shaw and William Mace (2003) state that
“an action must have an environmental support for that action, but the goal
or task-constraint must match [italics added] the environmental affordance”
(p. 202). What is the extent of this matching? Procedural architecture asks the
question by building surrounds that explore this matching capacity by making a
researcher/participant aware of the ways in which attention precedes perception
and when perception precedes attention.
The procedural architecture of Arakawa and Gins distributes the features of
built surrounds to purposefully disrupt existing perception and action cycles that
might cause a person to habitually respond or may allow a person to imagina-
tively overshoot or mismatch effectivity-affordance couplings. In other words,
if there must be a match between task and affordance as Mace and Shaw state,
it must be possible to purposefully mismatch a task to an environment and vice
versa. This would lead to deliberately overshooting or underestimating organism-
environment capacities and may lead to anticipating and perhaps adapting to
unforeseen matching potentials. This is what Arakawa and Gins might be allud-
ing to in naming one of their new procedures “mistake on purpose procedure”
(Gins & Arakawa, 2006, p. 196). This implies that the person can reenter and
dismantle the oppressive homogenization of the body that has resulted from
the way architecture has historically supported action. Common interest in the
human question should outweigh any predispositions concerning the outcome
of interdisciplinary research. There are better uses for art within psychological
inquiry than as demonstrations and illustrations of persistent perceptual effects.
There are many better uses of art than as a platform for commentary, cultural
critique, or investment venture. Artists and scientists must forsake their recourse
to an outside reality or an outside privileged position. Rethinking the position
and role of our daily activities may prompt researchers to become increasingly
aware of the shifting boundaries between environment and person, between
perceiver and perceptual field, between perceiving value and assigning value
that a productive tentativeness ensues—a crucial capacity in Arakawa and Gins’s
project. I believe this critical and open mode of bodywide engagement is itself
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an affordance presented by procedural architecture environments. At present, no
existing human or natural environment invites or supports these promptings and
modes of engagement.
A solution proposed by Arakawa and Gins consistent with the spirit, if not the
letter, of ecological psychology is the development of architecture as a tool and
a hypothesis for studying of the extent of the site of person (organism-body-
person-environment). If daily researchers were always to consider the “shape
of awareness” (Gins & Arakawa, 2002, p. 86), then architecturally produced
ecologies would emerge that could destabilize perceptual systems and make
perceptible the ways in which effectivity-affordance couplings form. Ultimately,
tactically posed environments may allow humans to anticipate or pre-adapt to
conditions for which the context/environment has not yet eventuated.
DISCIPLINARY POSITIONS AND RESEARCH VALUES
Harry Heft (2001) offers a way forward when he states that “knowing, or
mind, if you will, extends into the functional and symbolic possibilities of an
individual’s sociocultural world. Recognising this is truly an important step
toward a more fully realised ecological psychology” (p. xxxv). Despite the
common research goals shared by the arts and sciences, or more specifically
ecological psychology and Arakawa and Gins’s project—the body, perception
and action cycles, and the relation of organism to environment—there is still
not agreement on the methods to be used, the events to be considered, or the
discursive research constraints. I suggest that Arakawa and Gins break with all
forms of disciplinary methodology (in art or science). They are more interested
in the possibilities for the researcher/participant. The design of experimental
environments in ecological psychology, experimental psychology, experimental
phenomenology, and research design in general would benefit greatly from the
inclusive approach of Arakawa and Gins.
It has been my experience of their built work and their discursive works
that they are not interested in framing the form of the outcome but strive to
coordinate and correlate their findings and examine the means by which a person
“constructs” or may construct those findings. Rather than solely focusing on
the study of mechanisms, events, or phenomena, Arakawa and Gins’s approach,
based on ongoing sustained research in living laboratory environments, indicates
and acknowledges that we cannot separate ourselves from our experience, our
methods from our history, or the constructing of the world from the study of
the world. It is this last point that allows them to be more concerned with
the fact that we can directly perceive and we can use representational modes
of cognition; we can think conceptually and understand perceptually; we are
identical with ourselves and are constantly becoming other. The question for
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them it not which mode is correct but what does each mode deliver and how
can we move from one to the other to optimize our life capacity.
The translation of research values into social values can be seen most clearly
in the classrooms (from early childhood to university) and in the way, for
example, invariance or difference translates into pedagogical systems and institu-
tionalizes students’ measures and worldviews. As Bruno Latour (2004) points out
in his book The Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy, it
is recourse to an outside objective reality that creates problems within a society
built upon associations or what he calls a political ecology (p. 37). He argues
that science has allowed the gap between the world and reality to persist by
maintaining that only science can bridge the gap and break free of society to
achieve objectivity (p. 37). I think that Latour’s critique should include the many
artists, who are as likely as scientists, to administer reality from a position they
consider to be outside society and history. This is a modernist legacy. To avoid
this model of incontestable transcendence, or recourse to outside/elsewhere,
Latour proposes we reformulate the relation of culture and nature and decide
whether we want to add the history of the sciences provisionally or definitively
to the history of nature (p. 35).
The beginnings of a solution would be to interrupt all discourse that pre-
maturely unifies external reality and to remove the nature–culture divide to
form a collective of humans and nonhumans. Latour (2004) comments that
“the extension of the collective makes possible a presentation of humans and
nonhumans that is completely different from the one required of the cold war
between objects and subjects” (p. 76). A collective conceived in this way would
still be able to appeal to external worlds but without the ability to definitely
resolve any essential questions of the collective.
Although ecological psychology is committed to the study of the organism
in relation to the environment, Arakawa and Gins’s radical mode of inclusive
engagement tries to account for every aspect of life experience and life process
regardless of the category of event. It is to this end that they have proposed that
the “organism-person-surround” and the movements within and across scales of
action and modes of sensing should be the focus of our utmost attention.
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